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Asia’s share of world trade has expanded constantly over the last two decades. This increase reﬂ  ects, 
inter alia, the considerable strengthening of trade links between the countries of the region, fostered 
by the vertical specialisation of the Asian economies. In the 1980s, the most advanced economies in 
the region, e.g. Japan, relocated the most labour-intensive stages of their production processes to the
newly-industrialised Asian economies like South Korea and Singapore and then, in the 1990s, to emerging 
Asia, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The emergence of China has also given 
signiﬁ  cant impetus to regional trade integration. Surging intra-regional direct investment ﬂ  ows have 
accompanied and shored up trade ﬂ  ows, however, portfolio investment ﬂ  ows and cross-border bank loans 
have remained limited. 
Given that production processes within the region are complementary and that the ﬁ  nal destination for 
exports is outside the region, the lack of a regional exchange rate arrangement in Asia does not appear to 
be a concern in the short term. Indeed, the regional integration initiatives adopted in Asia in the aftermath 
of the 1997-1998 ﬁ  nancial crisis aim to build further resilience to ﬁ  nancial market turbulence. 
Firstly, deeper and more liquid local bond markets should make it possible to reduce the double ﬁ  nancial 
mismatch, i.e. the currency mismatch and maturity mismatch, which largely sustained the crisis. In this 
regard, the ASEAN+3 Asian Bond Market Initiative examines the supply-side issues while the Asian 
Bond Funds initiative of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Paciﬁ  c Central Banks (EMEAP) deals with
demand-side issues via the pooling of resources to buy bonds issued by member countries. Secondly, the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, which consists in a network of currency swap arrangements between the central banks 
of the ASEAN+3 member states, provides these countries with a regional ﬁ  nancial assistance mechanism 
in the event of a liquidity crisis.
The Asian vertical model of production appears to have reached its limit and is evolving towards a more 
“horizontal” model in terms of both production (substitutability of production processes as a result of the 
shift towards higher value-added activities) and consumption (expansion of the regional market linked to 
the growth potential of domestic Chinese demand). Regional monetary co-operation could therefore aim 
in the future at curbing intra-regional exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations in order to promote trade and investment 
within the region. 
NB:  The composition of the various groups of countries referred to in this study may be found in the Appendix.
  The authors would like to thank Daniel Cohen for his suggestions, and also Martine Chastang, Ingrid Gaudichau and Françoise Mejia for their assistance in 
compiling and editing data.ARTICLES
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Table 1
Trade openness of Asean+3 countries
Compared with the United States and the Euro area
(exports and imports of goods and services, ratios as a % of GDP, data in value terms)
Exports (a) Imports (b) Total trade
(a + b)
1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004
ASEAN+3 
countries 16 29 15 26 31 55
of which :
Japan 11 14 10 12 20 25
China 15 40 12 37 27 76




and Thailand 35 62 39 57 74 119
United States 9 10 11 15 20 25
Euro area
(intra and
extra-area trade) 28 37 27 35 55 71
Source: International Monetary Funds (IMF); Banque de France calculations
I
n 2004, seven years after the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
emerging Asia had become the main driver
of global economic growth, accounting for 43% 
of world GDP (in purchasing power parity) and 15% 
of world trade. 
Since the early 1990s, its growing share of world 
trade has been reﬂ  ected in expanding trade with the 
industrialised economies (United States, Europe) 
and also with the other Asian countries. The vertical 
structure of production processes between the Asian 
economies accounts notably for the surge in trade, 
which has also gone hand in hand with intra-regional 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In this context
of vertical specialisation within the region and 
reliance on ﬁ  nal consumption markets outside the 
region, the peg of Asian currencies to the US dollar 
has been decisive. However, in 1997-1998, the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis that affected the economies in the 
region called a halt to the rapid growth of their 
world and intra-regional trade. The Asian economies 
therefore developed several regional initiatives to 
reduce their vulnerability to external shocks.
This article examines the various regional initiatives 
that have been developed in Asia in the monetary 
and ﬁ  nancial areas in the wake of the 1997-1998 
crisis. It ﬁ  rst seeks to take stock of trade and ﬁ  nancial 
integration in Asia. It then goes on to analyse 
the objectives of Asian monetary and ﬁ  nancial 
integration and outline the processes that have been 
implemented to achieve these goals.
1| REGIONAL INTEGRATION
  IN ASIA: AN OVERVIEW
Based on the promotion of exports, the 
economic development strategy implemented by
Asian countries is at the root of the vigorous
intra-regional trade and the emergence of China 
as a trade hub (1|1). Simultaneously, intra-regional
FDI ﬂ  ows, which have accompanied trade expansion, 
have increased sharply, while bank lending
and other types of cross-border capital ﬂ  ows (equity 
and bonds) have remained limited (1|2).
1|1  Closer trade integration
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE STRUCTURE
The Asian economies’ trade openness has expanded 
substantially over the last decade. Measured by the 
ratio of exports and imports to GDP, the degree
of openness of these economies was multiplied 
by over 1.7 between 1990 (31%) and 2004 (55%). 
The ratio currently ranges from 25% to 84% for 
China, South Korea and Japan and is very high for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand 
(119%), which makes the latter economies more 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Table 1). 
The greater openness of the ASEAN+3 economies 
(ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan) reﬂ  ects 
their increasing contribution to world exports and 
imports. These economies’ share of world trade rose 
from 14.5% in 1990 to over 19% in 2004. Though a 
high degree of openness does not necessarily reﬂ  ect 
substantial intra-regional trade, Asian economies’ 
increased contribution to world trade has been 
accompanied by the strengthening of trade links 
within the region. ARTICLES
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Several indicators may be used to assess
intra-regional trade (Box 1).
Intra-regional imports accounted for close to 44% 
of the total imports of ASEAN+3 countries in 2004 
compared with 31% in 1990; intra-regional exports 
made up close to 35% of total exports, compared 
with 27% in 1990. Intra-regional trade increased 
from 29% of the total trade of ASEAN+3 countries 
in 1990 to 39% in 2004. The combined trade of the 
three main economies of the region –China, South 
Korea and Japan– accounts by itself for half of intra-
regional trade. In comparison with Europe, at the 
start of the European integration process, the intra-
regional trade of the countries that currently make 
up the euro area already accounted for roughly 60% 
of their world trade (Chart 1).
The 1997-1998 ﬁ  nancial crisis, followed by the 
bursting of the new technologies bubble in 2001,
put a damper on Asian countries’ world and 
intra-regional trade. During these different 
episodes, intra-regional trade slowed slightly 
more markedly than world trade. Since 2002, 
Asian countries’ intra-regional trade has found a 
second wind and is tending towards its pre-crisis 
level (Chart 2).
Moreover, the trend of the intensity index for 
intra-regional export trade over the past decade 
conﬁ  rms Asia’s strong regional trade bias. This 
bias is however much more pronounced for 
the ASEAN countries (index close to 4) than 
for the ASEAN+3 countries (index close to 2) 
because ASEAN+3 trade is strongly geared 
Box 1
Indicators of intra-regional trade
Two indicators are traditionally used in the literature to assess intra-regional trade: a relative indicator and an indicator
of intensity. They are deﬁ  ned as follows:
The relative indicator of intra-regional exports (A):   A = Xij / Xi.
The relative indicator of intra-regional imports (A’):   A’ = Xji / X.i
The relative indicator of intra-regional trade (A’’):   A’’ = (Xij + Xji) / (Xi. + X.i)
The indicator of intensity of intra-regional trade to exports (B) or to imports (B’): 
B = 
Xij / X..




; B' = 
Xij / X..




or  Xij = Exports from country (or region) i to country (or region) j;
  Xji  = Imports from country (or region) i from country (or region) j;
  Xi. = Total exports from country (or region) i;
  X.i = Total imports from country (or region) i;
  X.. = World exports = World imports.
The relative indicator compares trade between two trading partners (country or geographical area) to the world trade
of one of the two trading partners (country or area).
The indicator or index of intensity assesses the trade between two trading partners while taking account of their share
of world trade. Therefore, if the index is equal to one, the intensity of bilateral (or regional) trade is neutral; if it is more
(or less than) one, there is a bias in favour (or to the detriment) of regional trade.
Sources: Urata (2004).ARTICLES
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Chart 1
Intra-regional trade between ASEAN
and ASEAN+3 countries and the European Union
(exports and imports of intra-regional goods, data in value terms, ratios as a %
of world trade)
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Sources: IMF, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Dorrucci et al. (2002);
Banque de France calculations
Chart 2
Growth rate of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 countries’ world
and intra-regional trade
(trade in goods in value terms, annual percentage growth rate)
1995 1991 1997 1993 2003 1999 2001
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towards countries outside the region (Chart  3). 
In international comparisons, Sakakibara and 
Yamakawa (2004) show that ASEAN has higher 
intra-regional trade intensity than other areas such 
as the European Union and NAFTA, whose intensity 
indices are at around 2 and 3 respectively. In the 
case of ASEAN+3, the regional bias is stronger than 
for Europe but less so than for NAFTA due to the less 
marked regional preference shown by China, Japan 
and South Korea.
The rapid growth in intra-regional trade cannot 
be solely attributed to a “gravity effect” linked to 
the economic size and the geographical proximity 
of the ASEAN+3 countries. Using a gravity model 
for trade between the three major economies
of the region (China, South Korea and Japan) and 
the ASEAN countries over the last two decades, 
Kim (2002) shows that the “observed” level of trade 
between these two groups of countries is higher 
than the “predicted” level. This therefore points 
to the existence of other factors accounting for the 
intensity of intra-regional trade.ARTICLES
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Chart 4
ASEAN+3 countries’ share of trade with China and Japan
(as a % of the total)











Indeed, the sharp acceleration of intra-regional 
trade also appears to be increasingly traceable 
to the vertical integration of these economies’ 
production chains, like Japan and South Korea in the
1960-1980s period. The higher-income economies 
retain the capital-intensive processes and relocate 
the labour-intensive processes to the countries with 
lower incomes, specialised in assembly operations. 
Akamatsu (1962) and Yamazawa (1990) referred 
to the “ﬂ  ying geese” pattern of development of 
the Asian economies. This vertical redistribution
of labour within the Asian economies can moreover 
be seen in the concentration of their intra-regional 
trade in intermediate goods. Trade in intermediate 
goods rose from 25% of intra-regional exports at the 
end of the 1970s to 47% in 2002 (Zebregs, 2004).
CHINA: A TRADE HUB
Over the last two decades, China has replaced Japan 
as Asia’s trade hub.
In the mid-1980s, Japan initiated the vertical 
production process established within the area, with 
Japanese ﬁ  rms relocating their production to the 
four “dragons” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan) and then to the four “tigers” (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). These 
countries’ economic catch-up and their openness 
to world trade subsequently curbed the fast growth 
of their trade with Japan (imports and re-exports). 
Conversely, these economies became increasingly 
commercially dependent on China. China’s share
of intra-regional trade has expanded constantly
since 1990 (Chart 4). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China’s trade structure was 
dominated by transport machinery and equipment 
and manufactured goods. In fact, Indonesia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and to a lesser extent 
Malaysia, which had also specialised in these 
sectors, ran the risk of being overshadowed by 
China. Conversely, a rise in quality in Japan, 
Singapore and South Korea led these countries to 
develop a trade structure complementary to that 
of China.
From the 2000s onwards, China diversiﬁ  ed  its 
trade base by focusing on trade in computer and 
communications equipment and electronics, 
becoming a competitor of Indonesia, Thailand, 
the Philippines and Malaysia in these sectors. 
China’s contribution to the growth in intra-regional 
electronics imports (Chart 5) has increased over 
the past three years. Soaring intra-regional trade 
in the electronics sector reﬂ  ects the development
of assembly trade within the area to re-export.
Chart 5
Growth of intra-regional electronics imports
among ASEAN+3 countries 
(annual percentage growth rate and China’s contribution in percentage points 
of the annual growth rate)










Annual growth rate of intra-regional electonics imports
China's contribution
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Source: Chelem datase (Harmonised Accounts on Trade and the World Economy)ARTICLES
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Chart 6
Trend towards the convergence of potential growth 
and business cycles of the ASEAN+3 countries
(standard deviation of output and potential growth gaps)









Output gap Potential growth
2012
Forecasts
Note: trend/cycle decomposition using a ﬁ  lter (HP, λ = 100, based on annual data)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook; Banque de France calculations
Chart 7















Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore (2003)
Overall, trade integration in Asia is likely to increase 
the interdependence of the ASEAN+3 economies 
and therefore, make their growth less dependent 
on the world economy and more centred on China. 
In particular, China may be called upon to play a 
key role in the region as its intra-industry trade 
develops and its domestic demand expands. In fact, 
the sharp increase in intra-regional intra-industry 
trade has been accompanied by a trend towards 
the synchronisation of business cycles across the 
ASEAN+3 countries that seems to have become 
more pronounced since the early 2000s (Chart 6). 
Lastly, the high degree of trade openness and 
the extensive intra-regional trade may permit the 
economies of the region to beneﬁ  t from China’s 
strong growth. However, these factors also constitute 
a risk in the event of an exogenous shock affecting 
one of the economies.
THE ROLE OF FINAL EXPORT MARKETS
OUTSIDE ASIA
Despite soaring intra-regional trade, the vertical
re-organisation of production chains makes the 
Asian economies ultimately reliant on ﬁ  nal demand 
from the US or European markets.
An estimate by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
shows that while 36% of the area’s exports
of intermediate goods are intra-regional exports,
14% are subsequently re-exported outside the
region. Overall, 78% of the region’s exports are 
to ﬁ  nal markets outside the region while 22% are 
absorbed by the region (Chart 7).
Moreover, a recent study (Bank of Japan, 2004) 
illustrates the existing “transmission  chain”, 
which starts from the ﬁ  nal export market, i.e. the
United States, and goes up to the Japanese economy, 
via China and the South-East Asian economies. 
The ﬁ  ndings show that a positive shock of 1% on 
the United States’ GDP leads not only to a rise in 
Japanese exports to the US market but also a fairly 
similar increase in Japanese exports to the East Asian
economies after two years. 
Regarding China’s role as the assembly platform
of Asia, the relation of dependency between China’s 
imports from other Asian countries and China’s 
exports to the United States is illustrated by the 
relatively similar growth patterns of the two types 
of trade (Chart 8).ARTICLES
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Chart 8
China’s trade –exports to the United States
and imports from Asia

























Exports to the United States
Imports from Japan
Imports from South Korea
Imports from ASEAN
Source: China Customs Statistics
Chart 9
Intra-regional FDI ﬂ  ows in ASEAN+3 countries
(as a % of total)











Source: United Nations Conference on trade and development;
Banque de France calculations
1|2 Slower  progress
 in  ﬁ  nancial integration
PREDOMINANT INTRA-REGIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT
Concomitant with the growing intra-regional trade, 
surging FDI ﬂ  ows between the Asian economies 
have strengthened the regional integration process. 
In fact, in the model of vertical specialisation, 
investments made by ﬁ  rms from the most advanced 
economies such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore 
in the emerging or developing Asian economies 
have helped to boost their trade. 
Intra-regional FDI outﬂ   ows have picked up 
signiﬁ  cantly since 2000, accounting for 44% of the 
ASEAN+3 countries’ total FDI outﬂ  ows in 2002
(a proportion relatively close to that of intra-regional
trade ﬂ   ows). Intra-regional FDI inﬂ  ows  have 
stabilised at around 20% of total inward FDI.
Intra-regional FDI ﬂ  ows nonetheless remain below 
their pre-crisis levels (Chart 9). However, the three 
major regional economies’ (China, South Korea and 
Japan) share of inward and outward FDI outside the 
area tends to put this trend into perspective. Thus, 
in 2002, outward FDI from ASEAN to ASEAN+3 
accounted for 73.5% of their total FDI outﬂ  ows 
while 57% of FDI inﬂ  ows into ASEAN were from 
ASEAN+3. Japan and Singapore are the main
intra-regional FDI origin countries while China
and Malaysia are the main recipients.
In comparison, FDI inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows within the 
EU currently exceed 65% of the FDI the European 
countries receive from or invest in the rest of the 
world (Chart 10).
Since the Asian crisis, the regional magnets for 
FDI have shifted from the ASEAN countries to 
China (Chart 11). This move was spurred not only 
by the direct impact of the crisis, but also, inter 
alia, by China’s growing attractiveness, stemming 
from its cheap labour costs and its on-going trade 
Chart 10
EU countries’ intra-regional FDI ﬂ  ows
(as a % of total)










Note: The data concern EU-15 up to 2000 and EU-25 from 2001.
Source: Eurostat; Banque de France calculationsARTICLES
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Chart 11
Destination of ASEAN+3 countries’ FDI ﬂ  ows











Source: United Nations Conference on trade and development.
Chart 12
Purpose of Japanese companies’ direct investment 
in China














Sales on the local market (left-hand scale)
Exports to third countries (left-hand scale)
Exports to Japan (left-hand scale)






Source: Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI)
Chart 13
Purpose of Japanese companies’ direct investment 
in the United States
(USD billions)  (%)
Q3 Q1
2003















Sales on the local market (left-hand scale)
Exports to third countries (left-hand scale)
Exports to Japan (left-hand scale)
Ratio of exports to total sales (right-hand scale)
Source: Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI)
and ﬁ  nancial liberalisation. Thus, though in 1995 
ASEAN received 31% of ASEAN+3 countries’ total 
FDI inﬂ  ows and China 23%; in 2002 the grouping 
received only 16% compared with China’s 27%.
As an example, according to the ﬁ  ndings of the survey 
conducted by Japan’s Ministry of the Economy, 
Trade and Industry, until recently, FDI by Japanese 
companies in China was geared primarily towards 
exporting and not selling on the local markets, 
unlike their direct investments in the United States 
(Charts 12 and 13). 
LIMITED CROSS-BORDER BANK LENDING
AND PORTFOLIO FLOWS 
The Asian economies’ ﬁ  nancial integration appears 
to be trailing considerably behind1 their trade 
integration.
While their integration into the international 
ﬁ  nancial markets has advanced substantially in 
recent years,2 regional ﬁ  nancial markets remain 
poorly developed. In general, the South-East Asian 
economies’ stock markets appear to be more closely 
integrated into the US market than the Japanese 
market. For example, foreign investors accounted 
for close to 30% of turnover on the stock markets
of Japan, South Korea and Thailand in 2004, but only 
a minority of these investors seem to come from 
other Asian countries (IMF, 2005a). 
Likewise, banking integration appears to be more 
advanced with banks outside the region. The 
foremost foreign banks in terms of outstanding 
claims are European (British in particular) and
US banks, which predominate in a number of Asian 
countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. Japanese banks often 
1  It is moreover difﬁ  cult to measure because of the lack or inaccessibility of data.
2  These markets captured half of the private capital ﬂ  ows to emerging economies in 2003, and two-thirds in 2004.ARTICLES
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come third, except in Korea where they rank ﬁ  rst 
among foreign banks (IMF, 2005a). 
This assessment of the deepness of ﬁ  nancial 
markets and banking integration in the region must 
nonetheless be put into perspective.
A number of studies show that Asian cross-border 
capital ﬂ  ows are probably underestimated because 
estimates do not cover transactions carried out by 
Asian investors on offshore markets. For instance, 
most Asian sovereign and corporate bond issues 
denominated in foreign currencies are denominated 
in US  dollars outside Asia (up to 80% in the
United States and in Europe), however a large 
proportion of these issues are underwritten by
South-East Asian investors active on these markets 
(BIS, 2002; IMF, 2005a). 
Similarly, Asian banks play a leading role 
internationally in the structuring of syndicated bank 
loans granted to Asian residents, as arrangers as well 
as fund providers (BIS, 2002).
Overall, intra-regional trade and FDI ﬂ  ows in Asia 
essentially reﬂ  ect a vertical production model, 
while the other intra-regional ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows are, 
in all likelihood, developing outside the region on 
offshore markets. 
2| MONETARY
  AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION:
 O BJECTIVES AND INITIATIVES
Due to the vertical structure of the different 
stages of production in the region and the ﬁ  nal 
destination of the regional exports (United States 
and Europe), the lack of a regional exchange 
rate arrangement in Asia does not appear to be a 
concern in the short term. However, in the long 
run, a “horizontal” model will emerge from, the 
substitutability of production stages resulting from 
the shift towards higher value-added activities 
within the region, and an expansion of the regional 
consumer market reﬂ  ecting the growth potential
of Chinese domestic demand. As this model 
gradually develops, closer monetary co-operation 
would be useful to reduce intra-regional exchange 
rate ﬂ   uctuations and promote intra-regional 
trade and investment (2|1). Indeed, the regional 
integration initiatives conducted in the wake of 
the Asian crisis were more the result of ﬁ  nancial 
concerns than monetary objectives. These 
initiatives aimed to guard against the risks of 
ﬁ  nancial crises by fostering, at the regional level, 
the development of local bond markets (2|2) and a 
pooling of foreign exchange reserves (2|3).
2|1  Increasing regional monetary
 stability  to  facilitate
 intra-regional  trade
 and  investment
As with the European experience, the strengthening 
of monetary co-operation in Asia could help 
to boost intra-regional trade and investment.
The region already enjoys relatively stable
exchange rates as many of its currencies 
are pegged to the US  dollar. However, closer
intra-regional ﬁ  nancial and trade links could prompt
Asian countries to seek to stabilise intra-Asian 
bilateral exchange rates and, in the longer term, 
to form a regional currency union. 
GUARANTEEING THE STABILITY
OF INTRA-REGIONAL EXCHANGE RATES
According to the IMF classiﬁ  cation  (2005b), 
Malaysia and China adopted ﬁ  xed exchange rates 
while Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines 
maintained ﬂ  oating exchange rates. Between these 
two extremes, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam chose a managed 
ﬂ  oating rate regime and Brunei opted for a currency 
board regime. Beyond this diversity of exchange 
rate regimes, many economies in the region chose 
to peg de facto or de jure their currency to the
US dollar in order to maintain the competitiveness.
The relative stability of intra-regional exchange rates ARTICLES
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Chart 15
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depreciation
Note: CY-Chinese yuan; MR-Malaysian ringgit; PP-Philippine peso; SD-Singapore 
dollar.
Source: IMF
is therefore ensured through the dollar link. Indeed, 
the exchange rates of Asian currencies against the 
dollar are generally less volatile than that of the euro 
(Chart 14). 
Furthermore, the real effective exchange rates of a 
number of currencies in the region for which data 
are available have been relatively stable since early 
2004 (Chart 15).
The ongoing strength of Asian trade with countries 
outside the region (United States and Europe) 
would not justify, at this stage, a common peg to a 
regional currency. Moreover, the “vertical” model 
of production structures in the region reduces the 
impact of exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations on the different 
economies given the non-substitutability of the 
various stages of production. Conversely, in Europe, 
as the production process is more “horizontal”, 
the similarity of production activities makes the 
different economies more sensitive to exchange rates 
movements that could result in production activities 
being shifted to more competitive countries.
In the short term, a common peg is not a priority for 
Asian economies, but it may become necessary in 
the longer term. As the least developed countries in 
the region catch up, they will be able to move into 
higher value-added activities, using a “horizontal” 
production model, while the strong growth expected 
in Chinese domestic demand will boost trade in ﬁ  ne 
Chart 14

























MR/USD (left-hand scale) PP/USD (left-hand scale) SD/USD (left-hand scale)
EUR/USD (left-hand scale) IR/USD (right-hand scale) TBH/USD (left-hand scale)
* Note: MR-Malaysian ringgit; PP-Philippine peso; SD-Singapore dollar; IR-Indonesian rupiah; TBH-Thai baht.
Sources: national sources; Banque de France calculations
between regional consumer markets, developing 
a horizontal consumption model. From then on, 
further monetary integration, which should reduce 
the direct exchange rate volatility between Asian 
currencies, would increase trade and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows 
within the region.
A number of proposals have been put forward to 
achieve an exchange rate arrangement in Asia, 
including pegging to one of the region’s currencies 
(yen or renminbi), to a currency outside the region, 
such as the dollar (Kwan, 2001; Nasution, 2005), ARTICLES
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or establishing a basket system of G-3 currencies, 
i.e. the euro, the dollar and the yen (Williamson, 
2005; Ogawa et al., 2004; McKinnon, 2002). In
December 2005, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
announced that it was working on the composition 
of a basket of ASEAN+3 currencies. This basket, 
modelled on the European Currency Unit, would 
be a theoretical currency unit (the Asian Currency 
Unit), and is expected to be launched in June 2006. 
It will serve as a benchmark for managing the 
regional exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations and will facilitate 
international comparisons with the dollar and the 
euro. In the longer term, it might result in the 
creation of a currency area. 
ACHIEVING AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA
In the 1960s, theories on Optimal Currency Areas 
(OCAs), pioneered by Robert Mundell (1961), 
maintained that, under certain conditions, a 
monetary union could lead to an increase in trade in 
the area. By reducing the costs of cross-border trade 
and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows and by removing exchange rate 
volatility in the region, an OCA would enhance trade 
(of goods and services) and investment between the 
countries forming the union (and boost its growth 
potential). These gains are to be set against the 
main cost associated with the formation of an OCA: 
the loss of autonomy in the conduct of national 
monetary policies. In this respect, literature on OCAs 
shows that the beneﬁ  ts (or costs) would increase
(or decrease) according to:
• the ﬂ  exibility of wages and prices in the countries 
of the union;
• the mobility of factors of production (capital and 
labour) between the countries of the union;
• the symmetry of the impact of shocks between the 
countries of the region;
• the degree of openness of the countries of the union;
• and the share of intra-regional trade.
For ASEAN countries, Eichengreen and
Bayoumi (1996) developed a composite index 
taking account of the relative costs and beneﬁ  ts 
(asymmetrical shocks, exports structures, bilateral 
trade intensity and economic size) associated with 
member countries adopting a common currency. 
On the basis of this index, they concluded 
that country pairs such as Singapore-Malaysia,
Singapore-Thailand, Singapore-Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong-Taiwan were the best suited to form an 
OCA. In contrast, the case for Indonesia, South 
Korea and the Philippines was weaker. And the
Malaysia-Thailand pair would have relatively little 
economic incentive to adopt such an external peg. 
Using the same approach, Madhur (2002) shows that 
ASEAN countries satisfy most of the OCA criteria. 
However, these indicators should be interpreted with 
caution. Frankel and Rose (1998), for instance, stress 
the endogeneity of some OCA criteria and show, in 
particular, that the closer the trade within the area, 
the more highly synchronized the business cycles.
2|2 Relocating  ﬁ  nancial
 intermediation  activities
  within the region
Following the ﬁ  nancial crisis of 1997-1998, Asian 
countries attempted to reduce their reliance on 
domestic and international bank borrowing by 
increasing the depth and liquidity of their local 
currency bond markets. They thus sought to 
enhance regional ﬁ  nancial co-operation. These 
initiatives were spurred by two organisations: 
ASEAN+3 with the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative (ABMI) and the Executives’ Meeting of
East Asia-Paciﬁ  c Central Banks (EMEAP) with the 
Asian Bond Fund initiative (ABF).
REDUCING THE ECONOMY’S RELIANCE
ON FOREIGN-CURRENCY BANK FINANCING
Many factors account for the heavy reliance of 
both private and public Asian economic agents on
short-term bank borrowing. First, the 
“ﬁ  nancial repression” policies conducted by these 
countries in the 1970s explain why the ﬁ  nancial 
markets are underdeveloped. In a “repressed” 
ﬁ  nancial system, the government directly allocates 
bank credits to certain sectors such as agriculture, 
sets an interest rate ceiling for state bank lending, 
and bears in ﬁ  ne the credit risk. In this way, 
economic agents that can obtain cheap credits with 
low risk from state banks, have little incentive to 
use ﬁ  nancial markets to raise funds from capital 
and securities markets. Furthermore, tax policies
(e.g. stamp-duty on transfer of bond ownership) ARTICLES
Recent developments in monetary and ﬁ  nancial integration in Asia
122  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 8 • May 2006
Chart 16
Outstanding stock of US Treasuries
held by the main Asian investors
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impede the development of the secondary market. 
Lastly, the lack of appropriate market infrastructures 
(clearing and settlement) is detrimental to the 
liquidity of these markets. As a result, local currency 
bond markets played a greater role after the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis of 1997. The development of government 
bond markets acted as a catalyst for the corporate 
bond market (Luengnaruemitchai and Ong, 2005). 
Even though bank loans remain the main source of 
ﬁ  nancing in emerging Asian economies, corporate 
and sovereign bond issuance is rising sharply in 
some countries. For instance, in 2004, bond issuance 
accounted for 75% and 39% of GDP in South Korea 
and Thailand respectively compared with 80% and 
73% for bank loans. Moreover, these two countries 
have the largest corporate bond markets in the world 
measured as a percentage of GDP (IMF, 2005c). 
The development of local currency bond markets 
should in particular reduce the vulnerability 
of Asian economies associated with double 
mismatches: maturity mismatch (i.e. long-term
assets/short-term liabilities) and currency mismatch 
(i.e. assets in local currency/liabilities in foreign 
currency). Allen et al. (2002) attempted to quantify 
this double mismatch for Thailand in the period 
leading up to the crisis. Notably, they observed that 
at the end of 1996 a quarter of the liabilities in the 
banking sector and the non-bank private sector 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world were denominated 
in foreign currency, of which two-thirds and 
one-third respectively were due in the short 
term. Furthermore, more recently, the indicator 
constructed by Goldstein and Turner (2004) shows 
that, despite a reduction since the 1997 crisis, the 
currency mismatch persists in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, China, Thailand, and Malaysia.
CHANNELLING REGIONAL SAVINGS WITHIN THE REGION
McCauley (2003), in his analysis of the structure 
of capital ﬂ  ows to and from Asian countries since 
the 1997 crisis, stresses that while capital inﬂ  ows 
have generally featured private investors, capital 
outﬂ  ows can mainly be attributed to central banks 
from the region investing the proceeds of their 
foreign exchange market intervention in foreign 
assets. Genberg, McCauley, Park and Persaud 
(2005) estimated that in 2004, foreign public 
authorities, particularly in Asia, held around 70% 
of the outstanding stock of US Treasuries. Indeed, 
Asian countries’ holdings of US Treasuries (public 
and private sectors combined) have increased 
considerably over the recent period (Chart 16). 
This trend reﬂ  ects the lack of diversiﬁ  cation of Asian 
central banks’ portfolios, making them even more 
vulnerable to exchange rate risk in the event of a 
sharp depreciation of the dollar. Moreover, capital 
outﬂ  ows from the region would thus increase the 
depth of the US and European bond markets, which 
act as ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, instead of helping to 
develop Asian ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Ongoing capital account liberalisation in Asian 
economies should allow regional savings to be 
invested in the rest of the world as well as in 
the region (Eichengreen, 2004). For example, in 
Indonesia, China, and to a lesser extent in Thailand, 
foreign investors still cannot participate in local 
bond markets. However, the ﬁ  nancial crises of the 
past decade have shown that the strengthening 
of ﬁ  nancial systems has itself appeared to be a 
prerequisite for opening the capital account in the 
sequencing of ﬁ  nancial liberalisation. For instance, 
the creation of money markets, bond markets
(in particular for government bonds), foreign 
exchange markets, and interbank competition 
within the region would make it possible to 
ensure a more efﬁ   cient allocation of capital, 
generate a higher return on regional savings 
and provide ﬁ  nancing for investment at lower 
cost. In the longer run, these markets would 
help foster economic growth in these countries. 
Moreover, more ﬂ   exibility in the exchange 
rate regime and the macroeconomic stabilityARTICLES
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of Asian economies may be necessary to accompany 
this ﬁ  nancial liberalisation process.
In this context, the ABMI and ABF initiatives 
(see Box 2) aim to develop a regional bond market 
in parallel with domestic bond markets. The ABMI 
examines supply-side (issuers) issues, while the ABF 
deals with demand-side (investors) issues. ABF1 and 
ABF2 differ from the AMBI in that they involve the 
pooling of foreign exchange reserves to buy bonds 
denominated in local and foreign currencies.
The resources involved in ABF1 and ABF2, which 
amount to USD 3 billion, should have only a minor 
impact on the liquidity of regional bond markets 
(whose outstandings total around USD 1,500 billion). 
Box 2
The Asian Bond Market and Asian Bond Fund regional initiatives
ASEAN+3, with the technical support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), launched in 2003,  the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative (ABMI), which aimed to facilitate access to local bond markets by issuers and to strengthen infrastructures 
at the regional level. Six working groups were established under this initiative: New Securitised Debt Instruments, 
Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanisms, Foreign Exchange Transactions and Settlement Systems, Issuance 
of Bonds Denominated in Local Currencies by Multilateral Development Banks, Foreign Government Agencies and 
Asian Multinational Corporations, Local and Regional Ratings Agencies and Technical Assistance Co-ordination. In the 
framework of the ABMI, three countries authorised multilateral institutions to issue local currency bonds. For instance, the 
ADB, the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank have already issued bonds denominated in Malaysian 
ringgit, while the ADB issued bonds denominated in Thai baht. In May 2005, the last two working groups, having reached 
their objectives, were dissolved.
In parallel, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Paciﬁ  c (EMEAP) developed the Asian Bond Fund initiative (ABF1 and 
ABF2 created in 2003 and 2004 respectively). This initiative aims to meet the demand for Asian investment instruments from 
international investors (including Asian investors). Pooled resources from the foreign exchange reserves of EMEAP member 
countries are currently allocated to these bond funds. While ABF1 is fully managed by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), ABF2 is managed by the private sector, but the BIS acts as the fund administrator. ABF1 pools reserves to the value 
of USD 1 billion, to be invested in US dollar denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign borrowers in 
eight of the EMEAP economies (except Japan, New Zealand, and Australia). Following the success of the ABF1, EMEAP 
launched ABF2, which will invest USD 2 billion of EMEAP central bank reserves in local currency denominated bonds also 
to be issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign in the same eight member countries. ABF2 comprises two components: 
the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF). The PAIF is a single-index bond fund 
investing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign domestic currency denominated bonds issued in the eight EMEAP markets. 
It provides Asian bond market investors with an excellent opportunity to diversify their portfolios. The FoBF comprises
eight single-market funds investing in their respective markets. The ABF2 will gradually be opened up to institutional and 
retail investors from both within and outside the EMEAP region.
The ABF 2 structure for EMEAP investment
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Nevertheless, the usefulness of these funds should 
not be overlooked. First, they may act as a catalyst 
for promoting new ﬁ  nancial products denominated 
in local and foreign currencies, and for developing 
ﬁ   nancial market infrastructures in the region. 
Second, they facilitate cross-border investment 
in that they encourage member countries to ease 
capital controls and speed up the implementation 
of ﬁ  scal and regulatory reforms at the local and 
regional levels.
2|3  Preventing and managing
 ﬁ  nancial crises
The 1997-1998 crisis also highlighted the lack
of co-ordination between Asian central banks 
against speculative attacks. In addition to the 
massive accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves (around USD 2,000 billion in 2004, most 
of which are held by the three main ASEAN+3 
countries) resulting from the exchange rate 
policy, the strengthening of regional co-operation 
in monetary and ﬁ  nancial areas is also seen as 
a safeguard against the risk of ﬁ  nancial crises. 
For instance, regional surveillance and ﬁ  nancial 
assistance mechanisms, such as the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI), have been put in place.
STRENGTHENING REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE
MECHANISMS 
The ASEAN Surveillance Process was established 
in 1998, and extended in 1999 to Japan, China and 
South Korea (ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue). It is intended to facilitate decision-making 
and is guided by two principles: mutual interest 
and peer pressure. It is based on two mechanisms: 
monitoring to allow early detection of vulnerabilities 
and a peer review process to discuss the policy 
measures needed to address the vulnerabilities 
identiﬁ  ed in the monitoring exercises.
To a lesser extent, other regional bodies such as 
Asia-Paciﬁ  c Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the 
EMEAP are involved in reviewing recent economic 
and ﬁ  nancial developments in the region. APEC has 
a large membership far beyond South-East Asia and 
provides a forum for exchanging information on a 
wide range of topics: macroeconomic developments, 
exchange rates, ﬁ  nancial markets, capital ﬂ  ows, and 
infrastructures. The diversity of its membership 
nevertheless makes it difﬁ  cult to agree on common 
positions. The network of central banks established 
through EMEAP limits co-operation to monetary and 
ﬁ  nancial areas as it mainly focuses on central bank 
issues such as ﬁ  nancial markets, payment systems 
and banking supervision.
However, criticisms have been levelled at this 
multitude of regional bodies in charge of monitoring 
and surveillance in South-East Asia and the Paciﬁ  c. 
Henning (2002) argues that the multiplicity and 
overlap of these institutions and mechanisms may 
have already reached the point of “diminishing 
returns”. He suggests therefore that these processes 
be streamlined in order to better allocate resources. 
In this respect, the Manila Framework Group, which 
consisted of deputy ﬁ  nance ministers and central 
bank governors of Asia-Paciﬁ   c countries, was 
disbanded in 2004.
IMPLEMENTING THE REGIONAL LIQUIDITY SUPPORT
FACILITY
ASEAN+3 is the only organisation in the region 
to have considered a regional liquidity support 
mechanism in addition to its surveillance mechanism. 
The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) launched in 2000 
and revised in 2005 is a region-wide defence against 
future crises and complements IMF ﬁ  nancial 
assistance in averting ﬁ  nancial crises. The initiative 
comprises the existing regional ASEAN Swap 
Agreement (ASA), which amounts to USD 2 billion, 
and extends the coverage to all ASEAN countries, and 
a network of bilateral swap arrangements3 (BSAs) 
among ASEAN+3 members. Most agreements are 
dollar-denominated. In early February 2006, 19 BSAs 
amounting to USD 74 billion had been concluded, 
compared with USD 39.5 billion at end-April 2005. 
Automatic disbursement is limited to 20% of amount 
of this facility; any drawing beyond this limit requires 
an approval from the IMF, and therefore, is subject 
to IMF conditionality. To date, these facilities have 
not yet been used. However, the BSA (amounting 
to USD  6  billion) concluded between Indonesia 
and Japan when the Indonesian rupiah was under 
speculative pressure in August 2005 no doubt helped 
to calm the ﬁ  nancial markets.
3  Participating countries are able to draw from the BSA for a period of 90 days at an interest rate of LIBOR+150 basis points.ARTICLES
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Under the CMI, China, South Korea, and Japan are 
the largest lenders and borrowers. Aside from these 
three major economies, Indonesia absorbs one-third 
of the available resources (Table 2).
In May 2005, ASEAN+3 decided to enhance 
the CMI by adopting a collective activation and
decision-making process on the current network 
of bilateral swap arrangements, and an enhanced 
economic surveillance process at the ASEAN+3 
regional level. This latter task was entrusted to
the ADB.
The new CMI framework, which combines both 
stronger surveillance and increased ﬁ  nancial 
resources, could help the countries in the region to 
ease their liquidity needs during a crisis. However, 
the amounts involved still remain far lower than 
external commitments to the three countries worst 
hit by the Asian crisis (South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Thailand), i.e. around USD 125 billion, of which 
Table 2
Swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai initiative
(USD billions)
Lenders Borrowers
Japan China Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Total
Japan 3 13 6 3.5 3 3 3 34.5
China 3 4 2 1.5 1 – 2 13.5
Korea 8 4 1 1.5 1.5 – 1 17
Indonesia – – 1 1
Malaysia – – 1.5 1.5
Philippines – – 1.5 1.5
Singapore 1 – – 1
Thailand 3 – 1 4
Total 15 7 22 9 6.5 5.5 3 6 74
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance; Banque de France calculations
USD 40 billion  from  the  IMF (Table 3).  These 
regional liquidity arrangements must therefore be 
used to supplement other protection mechanisms 
against ﬁ  nancial crises: IMF ﬁ  nancial assistance and 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
Table 3
Comparison of the funds available
under the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2005
and under IMF ﬁ  nancial support in 1997-1998




by the international 
community in 1998
Ratio
ASA BSA Total (a) IMF Others* Total (b) (a)/(b)
Thailand 0.2 6.0 6.2 4.0 13.2 17.2 36
Indonesia 0.2 9.0 9.2 15.0 34.7 49.7 18
South 
Korea
NA 22.0 22.0 21.1 37.3 58.4 38
* Total of bilateral and multilateral agreements
Source: IMF; Banque de France calculationsARTICLES
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The regional monetary and ﬁ  nancial initiatives implemented by Asian countries in the wake of the 1997-1998 crisis are 
intended to develop the role of ﬁ  nancial markets in the ﬁ  nancing of the economies and to reduce vulnerabilities associated 
with ﬁ  nancial crises. However, this growing monetary and ﬁ  nancial integration in Asia has to be achieved in an orderly 
manner to safeguard against the following two risks: a contagion risk associated with the integration of ﬁ  nancial markets 
fostered by the Asian Market Bond and Asian Bond Fund initiatives, and a risk of moral hazard stemming from excessive 
risk-taking under the Chiang Mai Initiative.
These risks nevertheless seem to be contained in the short term given the small size of both Asian Bond Fund and
Chiang Mai Initiative: USD 3 billion and USD 74 billion respectively, compared with bond outstandings and foreign 
exchange reserves of around USD 1,500 billion and USD 2,000 billion respectively. Moreover, the exchange rate policies 
of these countries are de facto pegged to the dollar and promote export-driven growth while contributing to the ﬁ  nancing 
of global imbalances.
In the long term, it is likely that the amount of resources involved will increase, the production process will shift towards a 
“horizontal” model, and exchange rate issues will be examined with the greatest attention as soon as exchange rate regimes 
become more ﬂ  exible. In this respect, lessons could be learnt from the European experience in particular on the role that 
can be played by supranational institutions and a group of core countries acting as an anchor for the regional integration 
process. The conditions for their creation and their viability are nonetheless beyond the scope of this article.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX
List of regions and acronyms used in this article
Association of
South East Asia Nations (ASEAN)
Executives’ 
Meeting of
East Asia Paciﬁ  c
Central Banks 
(EMEAP)








ASEAN ASEAN + 3
Australia xxx




China x x x
South Korea x x x
United States x
Hong Kong xx
Indonesia x x x x
Japan x x x x
Laos x x




Papua New Guinea x
Peru x
Philippines x x x x
Russia x
Singapore x x x x
Taiwan x
Thailand x x x x
Vietnam x x